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Per Capita Income and Productivity as Indices of
Development and Welfare. Some Comments on
Kuznetsian Economic History
1. The Growth Paradigm
The point of departure of this paper is that a close connection exists between the use
of the national income accounts in economic history and the importance for that dis¬
cipline of what one might call the "Growth paradigm".1 Insofar as the long run
growth of the Wealth of Nations is the concern of economic historians, there is no
better frame of reference available for their work than the income accounts. Indeed, I
doubt whether meaningful research into the comparative history of economic growth
can be done without reference to those accounts (or to some Surrogate based on the
same principles). Nevertheless, this perspective has limitations—of which two are
worth mentioning here. First, it imposes a modern set of values on the past. In Kuz¬
nets' words, "the accepted definitions and measures of national product reflect the
broad features of modern societies dominated by the ideas of secularism, egalitarian-
ism, and nationlism". These imply that "if we want to contrast modern economic
growth with earlier periods and patterns of growth, we must evaluate and appraise
the earlier periods also in modern terms in füll knowledge that part of the difference
would be due to the fact that societies of the earlier times did not share many of the
notions of means, ends, and values that constitute impulses to growth is modern
times."2 The cost of this perspective is our inabüity to focus on the older values, insti¬
tutions and activities which may have had to be transformed or eliminated before
modern economic growth could begin. Second, the growth paradigm and its account¬
ing complement (national income) implies the primaey of consumption of goods and
Services as the aim of economic activity and subordinates all other processes—of
govemment, capital accumulation, or even production—to that end. Economic his¬
tory of this genre is a drama featuring man's conquest of nature for man's material
enjoyment. It is a fascinating drama and well worth our attention. However, there are
plausible alternatives—for example, the Marxist drama featuring class conflicts and
Cf. Tilly, R., Das Wachstumsparadigma und die europäische Industrialisierungsgeschichte, in:
Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 3 (1977); also Parker, W., Economic History seen through the
Income Accounts, in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 124 (1968). This volume
was also a Festschrift for Walther Hoffmann edited by Giersch H., and Sauermann H.,
(Quantitative Aspekte der Wirtschaftsgeschichte).
Kuznets, S., Modern Economic Growth. Rate, Structure and Spread, New Haven 1966.
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treating economic growth as a largely unintended consequence of those conflicts.3
For those of us who opt for the growth paradigm, of course, there is need for neither
self-congratulation nor apology, only for recognition of a conscious choice and, if
possible, acceptance of its limiting implications.
2. An Analogy
The argument of much of the paper is based on a general behavioral assumption and
an analogy. The behavioral assumption is that people generally act as if they would
rather be rieh than poor. The analogy is between individuals and economies. Just as I
believe that individuals prefer wealth to poverty, so too do I believe that poor coun¬
tries strive to become rieh ones. And in both cases I believe the relationship to be
non-reversible. Rieh people and countries do not strive to become poor ones. This
non-symmetrical relationship is important for the rest of the argument of the paper,
for it serves as a justification for comparing rieh and poor countries using the Stand¬
ards (or price weights) of the richer country as a measuring rod. Comparing condi¬
tions in this manner is to state how far along a given poor country is on its way to at-
taining the position occupied by a richer one. And to complete the analogy, we base
our comparisons of rieh and poor countries on the Standard of per capita income—
which means that we work with the individualistic notion of the representative con¬
sumer and make national economic welfare a function of individual welfare.4 Coun¬
tries—or regions—are thus seen as discrete bundles of individuals, a decisive number
of which are striving for higher incomes. Were this not the case, the long debate on
economic growth of the past three or four decades, it seems to me, would make little
sense.
3. Per Capita Income as Welfare Index
Using per capita income as a comparative index of economic welfare implies, then, a
unity of opinion about the individualistic ends and the means of economic activity.
Kuznets has written: "There is, after all, a strong element of community of human
wants and needs, translatable in the modern economic epoch into a set of widely pre¬
valent notions of means, ends, and values of economic activity".5 The sad truth, how¬
ever, is that such unity of opinion in societies over time and space is extremely hard,
if not possible, to document empirically. Significant criticism of per capita income as
3. In this sense W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge 1960, was, in fact,
a kind of non-Communist Manifesto, for it did see consumption and technology as the mas¬
ter processes of economic history, if not history in totum.
4. On an empirical level, per capita income appears to be much more closely related to a num¬
ber of important aggregate structural features of developing economies—e. g. the share of to¬
tal employment and product originating in the agricultural sector, the share of total income
spent on foodstuffs and the share of income saved—than is total income. That makes per
capita income a more useful instrument for comparative analysis. See esp. Chenery, H.,
Structural Change and Development Policy, Oxford 1979 or Chenery H., and Sirquin M, Pat¬
terns ofDevelopment, Oxford 1975. On the analogy between individual and national per cap¬
ita income see also Usher, D., The Measurement ofEconomic Growth, Oxford 1980.
5. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, p. 24.
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a welfare index stems, ultimately, from doubts conceming that unity. For the pur¬
poses of this paper, this criticism may be devided into üve points:
(1) the problem of non-material or non-economic welfare;
(2) the exclusion of non-market activities;
(3) the definition of final (or intermediate) goods;
(4) the assumption of constancy of preferences and production possibilities; and
(5) the problem of income distribution and community welfare.
a) Non-material Welfare
The first criticism is that improvements in economic welfare which rising per capita
incomes could conceivably reflect say nothing about non-material or non-economic
welfare. Non-materialist ends might have priority over material ones in certain socie¬
ties and, theoretically, satisfaction of the former could deteriorate as a result of im¬
provements in respect to the latter.6 This possibility is discussed below in connection
with "social indicators", but in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we can
only assume that changes in economic welfare are not systematicaUy (and negatively)
related to changes in non-material wellbeing.
b) Non-market Activities
The second and third criticisms really tum on the proper definitions of the ends of
economic activity and the resultant definition of the final produets going into na¬
tional income calculations. National income is a flow statistic reflecting market
transactions over a given period. For some countries and periods we have imputa-
tions for the value of non-marketed goods and Services such as rental income from
owner-oecupied housing and farm-consumed agricultural produets, but, on the
whole, market transactions are disproportionately represented. This means that, on
the one hand, comparisons of per capita income between developed market econom¬
ies and societies in which specialization of economic activity and 'hence' market rela¬
tionships are only weakly developed, could be biased against the latter unless correc-
tions are made for their relatively significant non-market activity. On the other hand,
there are some offsetting biases against modern economies for which imputations
might well be in order, e. g., the productive work of housewives (as Substitutes for
domestic servants), time spent in educational institutions, or the value of leisure time
generally. Thus, Nordhaus and Tobin have estimated the value of non-market activ¬
ity in the U.S. in the 20th Century at between 40 and 50 percent of GNP while Kuz¬
nets has suggested an upward adjustment for the leisure in the same country of as
much as 40 percent ofthe estimated national product.7 My impression is that the bias
against underdeveloped countries will be strongest for comparisions covering the
transitional or "take-off phase of industrialization, subsequently turning the other
way. For western European countries, I suppose, the shift in bias for intertemporal
6. See Gould, J. D., Economic Growth in History, London 1972, pp. 5-6.
7. See Nordhaus W., and Tobin J., Is Growth obsolete? in: Moss M. (Ed.), The Measurement
of Economic and Social Performance. (Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 38) N. B.E. R,
N.Y. 1973, and Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 220-34 and esp. p. 221. Also Ken-
drick J., Economic Accounts and their Uses, N. Y. 1972. For a brief discussion of this question
as applied to American economic history see. Davis L., et aL, American Economic Growth. An
Economist's History ofthe United States. N.Y. 1972, pp. 42-50. Cf. also Section 5 below.
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comparisons would come around 1900. This is a matter which only further research
can clarify.
c) Intermediate andfinal Products
The distinction between inputs, intermediate and final produets lies behind a further
set of possible biases. National income, as indicated, is convenrionally defined as a
net flow of final goods and Services over time. To avoid double-counting, the value
of produets used in the production of other final produets must be dedueted from the
value of total output—as in the classic textbook case ofthe flour used in the produc¬
tion of bakery goods. Problems arise when goods and Services satisfy intermediate
and final demands and Convention assigns them exclusively to one of those two
classes, or where such Conventions vary across time and countries. Per capita income
comparisons are biased upward in favour of the more industrialized countries where
goods and Services such as vehicles, transportation, water supply, sanitation and pol-
icing—which are in part costs of urbanization and industrialization and hence akin
to intermediate produets—are treated as part of final produets. This amounts to dou¬
ble counting insofar as other final produets embody these costs.8 The bias is easy to
conceptualize, but in practice, it is virtually impossible to distinguish the part of the
total product which is intermediate from that which represents final consumption.
Some urban amenities, after all, do (or could) reflect increased consumer Utility. Eco¬
nomic historians working in this area will have to decide for each country and period
under investigation, (a) which items are ambiguous and (b) how to allocate them.
A similar difficulty relates to the role of capital formation. Net capital formation is
commonly regarded as part of final product—on the convincing grounds that it
forms the basis of long-run and future consumption. It is difficult to identify, howev¬
er, because (a) some activities or commodities can be defined as either capital forma¬
tion or intermediate product and because (b) the flow or capital goods over time is a
gross figure and will inciude the production of replacements for capital used up over
a period, i.e. capital consumption allowances, whereas there is no clear rule for esti¬
mating the latter. Intercountry and intertemporal comparisons of per capita income
obviously will be biased against those economies which work with the narrowest def¬
inition of capital formation and/or make the largest deduetions for depreciation.
Typical problem topics are the treatment of government expenditure on social over-
heads or infra-strueture as intermediate produets, the treatment of current spending
by integrated business firms on construction of new plant and equipment as interme¬
diate output, or the maintenance of Standard deduetions on a capital stock of rising
durability.9 This should be, I suggest, an important target area for historical work on
comparative real incomes.
8. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 225-27. Intersocietal and intertemporal comparison
will reveal some of these "intermediate" goods to be only present in the more developed
economy, thus posing, in addition, a weighting problem. More on this below. See also on all
of these problems Ruggles N. and R, The Design ofEconomic Accounts, N.Y. 1970, esp. pp.
38-48. For Germany, Stobbe A., Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, in: Handwörterbuch
der Wirtschaftswissenschaft. Vol. 8, Stuttgart and N.Y. 1980.
9. Capital formation raises problems of theory into which the discussion above does not go.
See Usher, Measurement, esp. Chapter 5. On the measuring problems also Kuznets, Modern
Economic Growth, Chapter 5.
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d) The Assumption of Constant Preferences
Intersocietal comparisons of per capita income levels are dogged by the necessity of
the unrealistic assumption of constant preferences and production possibilities.
Much scattered evidence exists on the variability and mutability of tastes through
history, for example, in the discussion of protoindustrialization or of the economics
of peasant society, and who could deny that the emergence of new produets and
product quality changes are an important part of the history of economic develop¬
ment?10 Strictly speaking, absolute, incontrovertible proof of vast differences in pre¬
ferences across countries or time should mle out income comparisons qua welfare
Table 1: Illustration of Real Income Measurement over





















































































10. For the general problem, see Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 7-9; for "protoindustrialization"
and consumer preferences see. Kriedte P., et al., Industrialisierung vor der Industrialisierung.
Gewerbliche Warenproduktion auf dem Lande in der Formationsperiode des Kapitalismus,
Göttingen 1977, esp. Chapter 2 pp. 138-54; on "peasant economics" see Chayanov A. V., On
the Theory ofthe Peasant Economy, Edited by Thorner D., et al., Homewood 1966; Mathias
P., has raised almost the same question in "Adam's Bürden: Historical diagnoses of pover¬
ty", The Transformation of England, London 1979.
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comparisons Such proof, however, is not generally available for the period of mod¬
ern economic growth (since around 1750) and so we follow Kuznets and others in as¬
suming the broad community of wants and needs across countnes and time that the
income comparisons require
n
In so doing, to be sure, we are not free to do as we
please and are obligated to be as specific as we can about possible distortions (or
biases) in the comparisons executed In this connection we tread the ground well
known to economists as the "index number problem"—the essence of which is the
difficulty of comparing magnitudes which cannot be compared For comparisons of
real income—be they intertemporal or intersocietal—are only meaningful insofar as
they involve Indexes of prices and quantities of goods and Services having a common
denommator, and choosing the latter invanably mvolves creation of biases To make
this point clearer, a bnef digression on pnce index comparisons follows here
For Illustration purposes, take the example of a simple economy producing two fi¬
nal commodities A and B and compare two penods Table 1 below depicts the two
situations (with Q representing quantity purchased and P the pnce per unit of com-
modity) Three important, if banal, conclusions can be drawn from the Illustration
First, comparing the produets of pnce and quantity of different periods is not a
meaningful comparison of welfare if prices and quantities change, for pnce changes
alone do not represent changes in well-being and must be eliminated by deflation
This we may do by multiplying the quantities in both penods by the prices of penod
1 (Laspeyres Index) or of period 2 (Paasche Index) Either of these exercises will pro¬
duce the required common denommator and desired real income comparison
17
Sec¬
ond, the choice of deflator, i e , the period prices used as common denommator, will
have no effect on the welfare comparison only if either quantities of both goods or
prices of both goods change at the same rate as between two periods (as between pe¬
nod 1 and 2 in our table) Third, if relative pnces and quantities change (and that is
what we speak of when changes are not equiproportional) and quantities are nsing,
then the choice of first period prices will generally produce, ceteris paribus a higher
rate of change between periods than the use of end-penod prices (in the comparison
between period 2 and 3 of our example, e g 189 compared to 157 percent) This
makes sense in terms of the theory of demand, for that postulates a generally nega¬
tive relationship between price and quantity demanded and using the higher first pe¬
nod prices to value the larger end-penod quantities sets aside that "law of demand"
for the end period, so to speak, thus "permittmg" consumers to buy as much at
higher relative prices as they did when those pnces were lower Just the opposite ap¬
phes to the use of end-penod prices as weights (These yield a lower rate of real m-
11 J Mokyr's bnef survey of demand as a factor in the Industnal Revolution does not explore
the possibility of preference shifts except in connection with a presumed trade off between
leisure and money income He concludes that autonomous demand shifts were of httle de
monstrable importance for industnalization and pleads for supply onented analysis If his
survey is representative, there are few data available on this question See Mokyr J , Demand
vs Supply in the Industrial Revolution in Journal of Economic History 37(1977) Cf also
Mathias P, "Leisure and Wages in Theory and Practice, The Transformation who identifies
some possible data sources but on the whole coneurs with Mokyr s judgement
12 In terms of our table Index I has no relevance For completeness' sake it may be pointed out
that pnce Indexes bearing the names Laspeyres and Paasche have the opposite construc
tions, with the Laspeyres ~ Ipiq0/Ipoqo and the Paasche — Sp^/Ipoqi
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come change than the "law of demand" would seem to Warrant). It is in this sense
that we may speak of a "bias" in estimates of real income based on the deflators or
price weights used.
Turning back to the historical problem of real income estimates, we may ask
whether the empirical record confirms such theoretical expectations. The answer is
rather ambivalent. There is some seeming confirmation, both for intertemporal and
cross-country comparisons. It is believed, for example, that the rate of growth of real
incomes in the U.S., 1840-1900, is higher when 1860 prices are used as deflators than
when 1900 prices are so employed.13 And estimates ofthe GNP growth ofthe Soviet
Union, 1928-37, employing 1928 price weights are nearly 100 percent larger than esti¬
mates using 1937 ones (11.9 percent per annum instead of 6.2. percent!). Sectoral
time series studies support this argument.14 On the other hand, there are exceptions,
demonstrated, for example, in a careful study of Swedish income growth by Krantz
and Nilsson. In part, this reflects differing levels of aggregation: the broader the cate¬
gories aggregated, the weaker the Substitution effect. In any case, the exceptions re-
mind us that even a theoretical discussion of index number bias in growth measure¬
ment must make provision for the possibility of demand shifts (caused either by
shifts in tastes or income elasticities of demand.15 In fact, on theoretical grounds
alone, with income effects compensating Substitution effects, we can expect index
number bias to be negligible.
However, no discussion of the historical use of price indexes will be complete
without a few words on the conceptually trivial, but practically significant, question
of data comparability. In a strict sense, the world of economic theory with its prices
and quantities of individual commodities has no counterpart in reality, and both eco¬
nomic historians and national income accountants have to make do with improvisa-
tions and analogies. National income statistics reflect average prices and quantities,
but it is apparent that such averages reflect both different data processing Operations
and different types of transactions. Take the average price of a ton of Ruhr coal in
1855 and 1900: the estimated difference of 21 Pfennige (8,53 (1900) and 8,32 (1855))
or two percent, seems small, but it refers to two quite different commodities: anthra¬
cite or hard coal in the first year, and bituminous of soft coal in the second.16 Now
13 See Davis, American Economic Growth, p. 49.
14. Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 18-20, discusses this point, citing Moorsteen R., and Powell
R, The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962, Homewood 1966 and also Gerschenkron A, A Dol¬
lar Index of Soviet Machinery Output, 1927-28 to 1937, Santa Monica 1951. Gerschenkron
has elsewhere discussed this phenomenon of a Laspeyres vs. Paasche "bias" as an essential
part of growth, so that the phenomenon itself has been dubbed the "Gerschenkron Effect."
See Gerschenkron A, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge 1962,
Chapter 8 and 9, where the difference between the two prices indexes is seen as a measure of
structural change.
15. Krantz O., and Nilsson C.-A, Swedish National Product, 1861-1970, Lund 1975, deal expli¬
citly with the "Gerschenkron Effect" and attribute its Virtual absence in Sweden to signifi¬
cant demand shifts (Ibid., 196-202). See also Solow R, and Temin R, Introduction: The In¬
putsfor Growth, in: Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. 8, Edited by Mathias R,
and Postan M., Cambridge 1978, p. 6.
16. Cf. Holtfrerich C.-L., Quantitative Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus im 19. Jahr¬
hundert, Dortmund 1973, p. 18.
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coal probably represents a resolvable problem, but what about iron or steel9 Here it
is not merely a matter of specifications of physical properties of the commodity, e g ,
its subdivision into components such as bars, plates and rails and standardized
weight measures, but also of knowing whether the prices averaged reflect a Standard
procedure for estimating transportation cost from plant to representative consumer,
discounts for volume and cash purchases, etc etc
17
Then there is the question of uncertainties in the estimation of quantity data For
example, for the Prussian and German agricultural sector, the choice of penod, the
treatment of intermediate produets, and assumptions about slaughter rates and
weights are much more important determinants of the measured rate of growth of
output than are the choice of pnce weights This can be demonstrated by means of
the following estimates
18
Aggregate Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (vF) 2,1% p a
Aggregate Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (GH) 2,2% p a
Net Output, Prussia, 1816-49 (RT) 2,6% p a
Net Output, Prussia, 1816-52 (RT) 2,1% pa
Net Output, Germany 1846/49-1910/13 (L) = l,46, (P)=l,40 pa
Net Output, Germany 1850/54-1910/13 (L)= 1,85, (P)= 1,83 pa
Index number problems are not a neghgible factor and Warrant further consideration
in connection with productivity measurement But the point is, histonans of 19th Cen¬
tury productivity may face more dangerous enemies
We have already calied attention to the symmetry of time series and cross-sectional
comparison We thus expect the estimated income differences between nch and poor
countries to be larger using the latter's prices as weights Patel's expenments with In¬
dian and American data for 1959 showed a difference of 100 percent, i e , India's per
capita output was more than twice as high in U S dollars when measured in U S
17 Morgenstern O, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations 2d Ed, Princeton 1965, esp
Chapter 10 It should be pointed out that inferences about costs on the basis of pnce data
depend on assumptions about competition which require investigation They can be entical,
as the discussion of British, German and American productivity in the steel industry seems
to indicate See, e g Allen R C , International Competition in Iron and Steel 1850-1913 in
Journal of Economic History, 39 (1979), esp pp 933-37, where a debate with the study of
McCIoskey D , Economic Maturity and Entrepreneunal Decline Cambndge 1974, is joined
See also Webb S
, Tariffs Cartels Technology and Growth in the German Steel Industry 1879
to 1914 in Journal of Economic History, 40 (1980), esp pp 321-23
18 von Finckenstein, Graf M W , Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft in Preußen und Deutsch
land 1801-1930 Wurzburg 1960, Helling G , Berechnung eines Index der Agrarproduktion in
Deutschland im 19 Jahrhundert in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 4 (1965) Tilly R,
Capital Formation in Germany in the Nineteenth Century in Mathias P, and Postan M ,
(eds), Cambndge Economic History of Europe, vol 7, Cambndge, 1978 Jacobs A, and
Richter H
,
Die Großhandelspreise m Deutschland von 1792 bis 1934 Sonderheft des Instituts
für Konjunkturforschung Berlin 1935 The abbreviations vF, GH and RT in the text refer to
the sources von Finckenstein, Gerhard Helling and R Tilly, respectively L to Laspeyres
pnce weights and *P* to Paasche ones
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prices as when measured in Indian prices and much closer to American levels.19 A
less extreme but nevertheless significant difference was produced by Gilbert and
Kravis—by somewhat different methods—in their classic study of purchasing power
parity exchange rates between European countries and the U.S. in the early postwar
period.20 Table 2 summarizes their findings.
Table 2: Income per capita in Different Countries According to Exchange Rates and







U.K. 37 63 53
France 35 53 42
Germany 26 43 33
Italy 16 30 22
Source: M. Gilbert and I. Kravis,
An International Comparison of
National Products and the Purchasing
Power of Currencies (Paris, n.d.)
Last but not least I should mention here O'Brien and Keyder's study comparing
Great Britain and France as one of the first significant attempts to extend this kind of
analysis to 19th-century economic history.21 In this case, however, the fact that
French per capita incomes seem relatively higher with French price weights than




Patel S., The Economic Distance Between Nations: Its Origin, Measurement and Outlook, in:
Economic Journal, (1964). See also Kuznets, Modem Economic Growth, pp. 374-84.
Gilbert M., and Kravis L, An International Comparison of National Products and the Purchas¬
ing Power of Currencies. A Study ofthe U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Italy, Paris
n.d.
O'Brien P., and Keyder C, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780-1914. Two Paths to
the 20th Century, London 1978. It is useful to note, however, that in this comparison, differ¬
ing national output structures are used to weight two national consumption "baskets" (in¬
cluding items common to both countries) which, by means of Substitution of each country's
prices into the other country's "basket", yield two "exchange rates". These are then applied
to the money income of one country to permit one-currency income comparisons. That is,
Poqo/piqo or piqj/poqi where 0 = Great Britain and 1 = France. Their exercise involves only
conversion of French incomes into Sterling or: French income/p0qo/piqo and French in-
come/p^i/poqi.
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poor country dichotomy; for the country differences may have been small. In dis-
cussing how this method gets around some of the difficulties of using official ex¬
change rates for a cross-country income comparison, O'Brien and Keyder suggest
calculating two rates of exchange for every two-country comparison: the purchasing
power parity of Sterling in terms of francs (or the number of francs needed to pur-
chase a basket of goods representative of British consumption patterns costing 1 £ in
Britain) and the purchasing power parity of francs in terms of Sterling. This Sugges¬
tion correctly emphasizes that (a) the rate reflecting one country's price weights, say,
Britain's, permits conceptualizing how well off an average inhabitant of that country
would be in Britain with the average income of inhabitants of another country—in
this case, France; that (b) the same experiment with the other country's price weights
permits the opposite comparison, (c) that both rates are equally 'Valid", and (d) that
the difference between the incomes so converted reflects differences in preference
patterns but also gives us an idea of the maximum and minimum size of real income
differentials. Like all such explicit comparisons it is an exercise in hypothetical histo¬
ry. This particular case, to be sure, is a double exercise.
These observations return us to Kuznets' interpretation of real income compari¬
sons across time and space as being produets of a point of view rather than reflec¬
tions of universally objective measuments. The point is well taken, but we should not
forget that Kuznets also suggested that in long-run historical comparisons, some
points of view may be more valid than others. Where income gaps between countries
are large, he recommended use of the preference and production patterns, i. e., the
price weights, of the more advanced, high-income country for comparative purposes
on the grounds that poorer countries strive to become richer but not vice-versa.22
This brings us füll circle and back to the remarks about the universal community of
wants and needs and the analogy between rieh and poor persons with which this sec¬
tion began. It amounts to an endorsement of the use of per capita income as an index
of economic development, though the endorsement is a qualified one. In the next
section, we must conclude our discussion ofthat index by examining what is perhaps
the single most important qualification—the unresolved problem of distribution.
e) Income Distribution and Community Welfare
An increase in a country's per capita real income could mean an increase in its eco¬
nomic welfare in the sense of increased satisfaction of material wants, but such an in¬
crease will reflect the distribution of income, since, obviously, only those wants
backed up by income can be made effective. One could take the position that every
society gets the income distribution it deserves and regard per capita income as ever-
optimally distributed—be it in a social-democratic, welfare-state economy, a laissez-
faire liberal one, or a totalitarian communist dictatorship. But this would be pan-
glossian. Alternatively, one can impose modern distributional "welfare functions" on
the historical Situation investigated. On only moderately egalitarian assumptions
about the Utility of income to different classes of individuals in society, we have to
recognize, it seems to me, that increases in per capita income might not reflect in¬
creases in aggregate welfare at all, for example, if they were accompanied by a sharp
22. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 23, 484-85.
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redistribution of income in favour of the wealthiest members of the community and/
or against a great majority of Iow-income receivers.23
Given the fact of distributional inequality and the practical impossibility of assign¬
ing generally accepted Utility weights to different income groups, quite a few scholars
have chosen not to interpret real income per capita as an index of welfare at all, but
rather as an index of productive capacity, as an index of potential welfare, so to
speak. According to Harvey Leibenstein, for instance, increasing per capita income
represents increasing "possible achievement" i. e., a larger sum available for poten¬
tial redistribution, should that be found desirable.24 I disagree with the notion of
"potential welfare"25 and wish to return to the related interpretation of real income
per capita as productive capacity shortly; but for the moment, let us note that such a
reaction depends on one's ideas about the behavior of income distribution. In the
face of compelling evidence confirming the stability of income distribution across
time and countries, most economists and economic historians, I suspect, would find
it difficult not to interpret increases in per capita real income as improvements in
community welfare. And evidence showing non-negligible increases in the inequality
of income distribution, it follows, could be seen as reductions in community welfare,
deductible, as it were, from any increases in per capita real income.
In any case, that is the sensible approach followed in a number of important trea-
tises on economic development, notably those by H. Chenery and his collaborators.26
The schemes devised in these studies weight income growth in the different income
classes by the number of persons in them. Given the disproportionately large share of
population in the lowest groups, this amounts to assigning Utility points to increases
in the share of income increases going to the lowest income groups of a given coun¬
try. The logic of this procedure derives from its frequently practiced opposite: to
view aggregate per capita real income growth as welfare growth is, in fact, to weight
increases in the average income of the wealthy, say, the top 20 percent of income re-
23. Usher, Measurement, Chapter 3, lists identical tastes, equal shares in ownership of the fac¬
tors of production and/or unitary income elasticities of demand for all goods as the condi¬
tions for interpreting real income estimates based on observed prices and quantities as a
community welfare index.
24. Cf, e. g., Leibenstein H., Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, N. Y. 1963, Chapter
2; also Viner J., International Trade and Economic Development, Oxford 1953, Chapter 6.
25. The problem with "potential welfare" is that it is misleading, for a Situation with more po¬
tential welfare can quite easily be a Situation with less actual welfare if the contingent redis¬
tribution does not take place. The notion of "potential welfare" thus settles nothing. On this
and other related matters, see. Sen A., The Welfare Basis ofReal Income Comparisons: A Sur¬
vey, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 17 (1979). Sen, in fact, proposes some measures of
inequality of income distribution which are worth considering, but he appears, in general, to
take the position that a country's economic welfare is not measurable in terms of its per cap¬
ita income. I have a less rigorous understanding of economic welfare than Sen and persist, in
this paper, in associating it with per capita income—subject to one qualification to be men¬
tioned shortly. See also Usher, D., The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Com¬
ment, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 18 (1980).
26. Chenery, H., et al., Redistribution with Growth, Oxford 1974; Chenery H, Structural Change
and Development Policy, Oxford 1979; Chenery H, Armut und Fortschritt—Alternativefür die
Dritte Welt, in: Finanzierung und Entwicklung, 17 (1980); also Sen, Welfare Basis, pp. 30-
31, and some of the literature cited there.
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ceivers—who typically obtain 50 percent of a given income increase in poor coun¬
tnes—about 10 times higher than the income gains of the representative poor—
whose aggregate increment typically accounts for five percent of the total27 Alterna-
tively, weights can be assigned to increases in the share of the population living
above some matenally defined Standard of poverty The importance of such possible
adjustments lies in the fact that growth of per capita incomes has not automatically
contributed to alleviation of poverty in poor countnes in recent years Indeed, ac¬
cording to Chenery, in some places and times income growth has achieved less than
specific distributional policies have done In this connection we are invited to com¬
pare the experience of slow growers such as Cuba or Sri Lanka with fast growers
such as Brazil28 Histoncal extensions of the argument readily suggest themselves
They mn from the famous "Standard of living" debate concerning British workers
dunng the Industnal Revolution, through S Kuznets' well-known thesis on the in¬
verted U-curve of income inequahty dunng economic development (e g, increasing
inequahty in the early stages) to more recent work on Britain and the United States
by J Wilhamson, P Lindert and others
29
I have no wish to review this literature here
and only mention it as a way of suggesting that the distribution of income may repre¬
sent an important modification of per capita as a long-run development welfare in¬
dex
However, the word "may" in the previous sentence was used advisedly, for certain
problems emerge with this use of distributional considerations that have not yet been
satisfactonly resolved Their mention therefore concludes this section of the paper
The relevance of distribution for welfare interpretations of per capita income growth
will depend on answers to three questions (1) to what extent are we free or obligated
to impose our presumably modern welfare Standards on the past—even in the face of
evidence on the prevalence of wholly different welfare notions among the popula¬
tions being investigated Put in a comparative context do we impose one Standard on
two societies and will there be "bias" as a consequence9 (2) To what extent does a
distributional correction of per capita income Indexes imply recourse to a Standard
of individual aspirations which, strictly speaking, requires additional correction, e g ,
for average age and hfe cycle experience ofthe population9 (3) The evidence cited
above to the contrary notwithstanding, is a distributional correction necessary9 Or
rather what is the long-run relationship between income growth and the equality of
its distnbution9 I submit that if our answer to the last question is "positive"30 we can
27 Chenery suggests (in Redistribution with Growth) the following measure of development as
welfare G = w,g, + w2g2 + w3g3 + w4g4 4- w5g5 where g = the mean income of each quintile
of the population of income recipients and w = the population weight of each quintile
28 Cf esp Chenery, Armut und Fortschritt p 13 also Chenery et al, Redistribution
29 Cf Taylor A , (Ed ), The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industnal Revolution London
1975, Kuznets S , Economic Growth and Income Inequality American Economic Review, 45
(1955), J Wilhamson, Earnings Inequality tn Nineteenth-Century Britain in Journal of Eco
nomic History, 40 (1980), Williamson J , The Sources ofAmerican Inequality 1896-1948 in
Review of Economics and Statistics, 58 (1976) and the interesting observations on links be
tween inequahty and cost of Irving Indexes by David P , and Solar P, A Bicentenary Contri
bution to the History of the Cost of Living in Amenca, in Uselding P, (Ed), Research in
Economic History, Greenwich 1977
30 Some evidence points in this direction See e g Chenery, Stmctural Change, Chapter 8
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avoid some very difficult conceptual and empirical problems, though that will not
obviate the necessity of mobilizing the distribution data themselves. They remain as
significant desiderata of the comparative history of income growth.
4. Social Indicators and the Income Concept
Dissatisfaction with per capita income as a development and welfare measure pro¬
duced in the 1960's the so-called "social indicators movement". It represents the
search for quantitative indicators reflecting dimensions of social experience pre¬
sumed not to be covered by the national income accounts. Before taking up the social
indicators, however, I would like to make a few comments on some extensions ofthe
concept of national income which are closer to its original meaning and were men¬
tioned briefly earlier under the heading of "imputations". In the early 1970's, W.
Nordhaus and J. Tobin offered one of the most comprehensive Suggestion for exten¬
sions in the form of a "Measure of Economic Welfare" (M.E.W.). As the name sug¬
gests, their concern was with developing a more consistent measure of welfare than
GNP or income per capita were believed to provide. Welfare is defined as the con¬
sumption of final goods and Services including an allowance for leisure and a deduc-
tion for environmental deterioration plus the investment expenditures neccessary to
insure maintenance of the current rate of productivity growth into the future. Their
calculation thus (1) divides govemment expenditures into final consumption and in¬
termediate goods and Services ("regrettables" such as defense and other "inputs" to
other sectors); (2) divides household expenditures into consumption and investment
and intermediate activities (such as expenditures for travelling to work); (3) expands
the concept of capital formation to take account of consumer durables, education
and health investment, as well as investment (already mentioned) needed to insure a
given current rate of productivity advance; (4) expands the concept of final product
to assign to leisure time activities consumption values (this is by far the largest modif¬
ication, amounting to more than GNP for 1929, e.g.); and (5) makes a calculation of
the social costs of growth especially, those related to environmental deterioration.
Table 3 suggests their 20th-century importance.31
I must confess to mixed feelings about suggestions such as these. On the one hand,
we should think seriously about expanding historical national income statistics in a
similar direction, for a good a priori case can be made for some ofthe extensions sug¬
gested and, in any case, we are faced with the need to estimate the value of historical
transactions on the basis of evidence just as suspect and as indirect as that employed
by modern "imputers".32 On the other hand, a case can also be made—for some pur¬
poses such as the analysis of cycies—for reducing or limiting the measured product
31. This discussion is based on Nordhaus and Tobin, cited in note 6 and the discussion in that
NBER volume, see also Usher, Measurement Journal of Economic History, Chapter 7, Kuz¬
nets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 220-34, and Kendrick J., Economic Accounts and their
Uses.
32. For example, agricultural income is derived from crop and animal output estimates applying
market prices to /ion-market production, and much of non-agricultural income also must be
imputed, e.g., that of self-employed artisans.
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Table 3: Gross National Product and M.E.W, in the U.S.A.,
1929-65 (billions of dollars, 1958 prices)
1929 1935 1954 1965
1. Gross national product 203.6 169.5 407.0 617,,8
2. Capital consumption
NIPA -20.0 -20.0 -32.5 -54.,7
3. Net national product
NIPA 183.6 149.5 374.5 563..1
NIPA final output reclas-
sified as regrettables
and intermediates
a. Government -6.7 -7.4 -57.8 -63.2
b. Private -10.3 -9.2 -16.4 -30.9
5. Imputations for items not
included in NIPA
a. Leisure 339.5 401 .3 533.2 626.9
b. Nonmarket activity 85.7 109.2 211 .5 295.4
c. Disamenities -12.5 -14.1 -24.3 -34.6
d. Services of public and
private capital 29.7 24.2 48.9 78.9
6. Additional capital con¬
sumption -19.3 -33.4 -35.2 -92.7
7. Growth requirement -46.1 -46.7 -63.1 -101 .8
8. Sustainable MEW 543.6 573.4 961 .3 1.241 .1
NIPA= national income and product accounts.
Source: Nordhaus and Tobin as cited in note 7.
to market or quasi-market transactions. This is owing to the absence of annual data
for imputed items and the resultant necessity of extrapolaüng and interpolating for
missing observations. If the trade-off between observable market activities and im¬
puted non-market ones is subject to cyclical influences—modifications by means of
trend relationships may produce a distorted view of economic growth patterns and
also of welfare, as for example Nordhaus and Tobin's data do for the 1929-35 period
of U. S. economic history (when much involuntary leisure time emerged). The point is,
one's particular research interest may have to determine one's choice of definitions
of national product.
Turning away from national income to the "social indicators movement", we
should first note that in one sense this movement represents a step backwards: none
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of the proposed indicators are themselves as comprehensive as the income accounts,
and in contrast to the components of those accounts they cannot be added up to
something comparable to GNP. However, for many of the experts working in this
area of applied statistics the data requirements of GNP and its underlying assump¬
tions seemed to go well beyond available knowledge, particularly where comparisons
with less developed countries of the past and present were sought. One idea was to
collect those concrete data which were believed to represent development indicators,
were readily available, and posed no difficult valuation problems: for example, tons
of wheat or steel production per annum, numbers of bicycles or radio sets per head
of population, number of crude births per 1,000 inhabitants, and so on. Comparison,
it was hoped, could thus be extended to countries having no national income statis¬
tics.33 On the whole, however, this attempt has not been particularly successful,
either because the indicators or their averages, taken by themselves, had no clear
meaning, (either as welfare or capacity indicators) or because, where they were
linked via correlation analysis to GNP, they became no more than rather poor prox-
ies for the latter.
Table 4 illustrates the bind we are in. There is good correspondence in an or¬
dinal ranking sense, but the scales of the variables are multi-dimensional and hence,
quantitatively non-comparable. This means that for ranking purposes the indicators
are superfluous—since we already have per capita income statistics—but for quanti¬
tative extensions into times and countries with deficient data, inadequate, especially
when we note the irrelevance of some of the indicators for historical work on the
19th Century (e.g., radios or electricity).
The "social indicators movement", however, aimed in two other directions as well.
One of those reflects modem-day concern in industrial nations with the "costs of
economic growth". It is in search of indicators of social and environmental change
generally believed to affect social welfare. Here, the idea has been to develop an in¬
dex of the "quality of life" which could be combined with GNP to help to decide
whether economic change over a given period has been, on balance, socially benefi-
cial or detrimental for the population affected. This effort is closely related to the ex¬
tensions of the concept of real income discussed earlier (as "imputations"). It is
much too early to say what will come out of this attempt, but two tentative observa¬
tions seem relevant for our purposes. First, as in the correspondence "test" just dis¬
played, most of the indicators of social well-being are positively associated with
changes in GNP per capita. Given the widespread belief that the direction (or sign)
33. See on this, Gould, Economic Growth, pp. 11-14; Beckerman W., and Bacon R., International
Comparisons ofIncome Levels: A Suggested New Measure, in: Economic Journal, 76 (1966);
or the discussion of social and economic indicators developed by the UN in Nohlen D., and
Nuscheier F., (Eds.), Handbuch der Dritten Welt, I, Hamburg 1974. It may be added that
Gerschenkron's wellknown approach to European industrialization limited quantitative
growth analysis to industrial production, for want of more comprehensive, yet reliable, data.
Cf. Gerschenkron A., The Approach ofEuropean Industrialization: A Postscript, and Problems
of Measuring Long-Term Growth in Income and Wealth, in: Economic Backwardness, esp.
pp. 353-54; also Gerschenkron, The Early Phase of Industrialization in Russia: Afterthoughts
and Counterthoughts, in Rostow W. W., (Ed.), The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained
Growth, N.Y. 1963, esp. pp. 161-63.
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Table 4 (GNP per capita and Corresponding Indicators)
Life Expectancy (In Years)
P Employed as % of Labor Force
Average No of persons per Room
|3 Rate of Pnmary and Secondary
School Enrollement (%)
% of Dwelhngs with Electncity
% of Male Labor Force in Agnculturs
Manufactunng as % of GNP
|a % of Population in Cities with
20000 Inhabitants
£ Per capita Consumption of Animal
Protein (grams per day)
o No of Radios (Receiver per 1000
Inhabitants)
^ No of Newspaper (Daihes per 1000
Inhabitants)
|g GNP per capita (1960 $)
"jj Agncultural Output per male
00
Agncultural Worker 1960 $)
y Per capita Energy Consumption
(In kilos of coal Equivalents)
fe Rate of Enrollment Higher Education
(% of 20 29 Age Group)
1° Value of Foreign Trade per capita
(1960 $)
o Steel Consumption per capita (Kilos)
|§ Electncity Consumption
(Kilowatts per capita)
§ No of Telephones (per 1000
Inhabitants)
Source U N Research Institute for Social Development (Reprinted in D Nohlen and
F Nuscheier (Eds), Handbuch der Dritten Welt I (Hamburg, 1974), p 248
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of this correlational relationship is negative, that is an important result.34 Second, the
indicators are aggregative and say nothing about distributions and/or social inequal¬
ity. If we wish to correct GNP for changes in the degree of economic inequality, an
analogous correction for these indicators will also be in order.
A second prong of the "social indicators movement" has focused on the under-de-
veloped countries. Its proponents have interpreted economic growth as part of a
broader cultural process embracing social and political change. Such an interpreta¬
tion calied for (a) data on social and political change and (b) analysis ofthe links be¬
tween such data and more conventional indicators of economic development. I. Ad¬
elmann and C. T. Morris, in one of the more ambitious examples of this genre, have
shown that the interdiseiplinary data approach can enlighten.35 Applying factor anal¬
ysis to a cross-country array of many economic, social and political indicators—fac¬
tor analysis being particularly useful where an inductive approach is preferred and
no specific hypotheses are used to pre-strueture the data—they find that (estimated)
GNP per capita is closely associated with the non-economic factors of development,
but that the complex "factor" of "soc/oeconomic" indicators (including such varia¬
bles as "extent of dualism", importance of an indigenous middle class, etc.) corre¬
sponds much better to what we commonly think of as the conditions of underdevel¬
opment than the purely economic "factor" does.36 In addition, tracing the links be¬
tween economic, social and political variables leads Adelmann and Morris to a use¬
ful three-stage version of underdevelopment in which GNP per capita becomes more
closely related to purely economic factors as development proeeeds (from "very un-
derdeveloped" to "less developed") and also, in the third stage of underdevelop¬
ment, more closely associated with political ones.37 To sum up: these results suggest
to me that historians of development have something to gain by an extension ef the
indices of measurement to non-economic factors, particularly for study ofthe earliest
phases of industrialization, However, for investigations of western European devel¬
opment since around 1850—corresponding to the third phase—they are not likely to
be misled very much by relying on per capita income—so long as their main concern
34. Cf. e.g., King M. A., Economic Growth and Social Development, in: Review of Income and
Wealth, 20 (1974). I owe this reference to Rolf Dumke. For Germany, see Zapf W., Lebens¬
qualität in der Bundesrepublik. Methode der Messung und erste Ergebnisse, in: Soziale Welt
(1977).
35. Adelman L, and Morris C. T, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative
Approach, Baltimore 1967. Their goal, to be sure, is an improved explanation of economic de¬
velopment, not an analysis of "modernization". That branch of the indicators movement is
not discussed here at all.
36. One way of putting this is that GNP per capita categories bring together much more diverse
collections of countries with respect to socio-economic characteristics (such as size of tradi¬
tional agriculture, extent of dualism, etc.) than the "factor" "Socioeconomic Variables"
does. See Adelman and Morris, Society, p. 169, and the appendix to this paper where some
of their results are reproduced. See also Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, pp. 437-60, for
a discussion of non-economic characteristics of underdeveloped countries.
37. The Adelman and Morris discussion of this third stage with its emphasis on the emergence
of strong leadership commitment to economic growth and corresponding economic and fi¬
nancial policies gives it a resemblance to the experience of some European countries in the
19th Century, e.g., Germany in its "Take-Off* phase (in the 1850's and 1860's).
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is with economic development, and not the social and pohtical changes which accom¬
panied it
5 Productivity
Aggregate labor productivity bears a close resemblance to per capita income Indeed,
where the entire population is gainfully employed, capital consumption negligible,
and the foreign accounts are in balance, the two are virtually identical This concep¬
tual hkeness is important, for it reflects a duahty in the way we look at the economy
and the real income it generates it may be seen as a system of pnces and quantities
of goods and Services generating real income and welfare as a function of consumer
preferences, or it can be interpreted as a system of production possibihties generat¬
ing output (real income) as a function of technology For some purposes either per¬
spective will do, but where interest centers on the measurement of real income as an
index of development economists differ on this issue As suggested earher, quite a
few economists believe that interpreting output or income per capita as an index of
productive capacity avoids the problems of interpersonal compansons of utihty and
distributional considerations associated with income seen as welfare
38
They see de¬
velopment as an economy's progression from, say, position A to position B, where B
represents an economic state capable of producing all of the goods produced (per
capita) in position A plus some non-negligible quantity of goods reflecting income
growth, call it P—for increased productive capacity Thus B = A + P The words
"capable" and "capacity" are used to stress that while B represents more "potential
welfare" than A, it need not mean more realized welfare
I disagree with this Interpretation In terms of the example just given, I suspect
that we are likely to say that an economy is better off in position B than in position
A, a Statement which to my way of thinking has welfare connotations The notion of
"potential welfare" is, on this view, unnecessary baggage More importantiy, histori¬
cally relevant comparisons will typically involve economies with different bundles of
goods and Services Referring back to our example, we may wish to view states A and
B as two separate economies If we observe them to produce the same produets, x
and y, but B to produce more of each, there is no ranking problem However, it is
thinkable that we might observe that economy B produces more of final goods x and
y than economy A but much less of an intermediate good z (say, transport), mainly
because consumers in economy B have locahzed tastes causing locahzed consump¬
tion and reduced need of transportation Even if relative prices of goods x and y were
identical as between economies A and B, so long as transportation is an intermediate
good (and resources are perfectly convertible) there would be a difference in per cap¬
ita real income between A and B dependent upon demand differences
39
38 Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness p 12 This distinction has sometimes been applied in
the national accounts to the difference between national income at market pnces (welfare
measure) and at factor costs (productive capacity measure) See, e g , Gilbert and Kravis, In
ternational Comparison (cited in note 20) For critical discussion of this dismction see Usher
Measurement Chapter 4, and Sen, Welfare Basis
39 The example and much of this entire discussion is derived from Usher, Measurement Chap
ter 4
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Alternatively, turning to the topic of productivity comparison, we can imagine
economy A having a higher productivity or output per head than B in the production
of the only commodity it is capable of producing, say, good x, but B having the abü¬
ity to produce a greater variety of goods and Services, say, goods x and y rather than
just x. Any comparison ofthe productivity ofthe two economies will have to take ac¬
count of a bias connected with the comparison of non-identical bundles of goods and
Services. We have here, once again, the "index number problem", in this case in an
extreme form. Now, if we were to Substitute into our example the economies of the
American ante-bellum South (for B) and the North (for A), we could cite in support
of our argument an important criticism which P. David and P. Temin levelled against
Fogel and Engerman's analysis of slavery in their book on the American South—
Time on the Cross.40 Those reviewers argued that the extent of the South's productiv¬
ity (or "efficiency") advantage over the North in agriculture was dependent on the
relative price of cotton (and other goods) in 1860 and not only or even mainly on the
superior productive Organization and "labor efficiency" of Southern plantations. Be¬
cause the South could produce much cotton and because world demand for it was
buoyant, the value of its agricultural output could and did expand above Northern
levels. These values, divided by estimates of the available productive factors, pro¬
duced a "relative efficiency" or "productivity" differential favoring the South. But
behind that differential lay the crucial weight of demand. For this reason, David and
Temin suggested replacing the terminology "relative efficiency"—having physical
and technical connotations—with the label "revenue—getting efficiency".41
I have neither the competence nor the desire to adjudicate in the ongoing debate
on American slavery, but the particular criticism of interpretation of productivity in-
40. The literature of criticism of this book is immense. Some ofthe landmarks are: Fogel R. W.,
and Engerman S. L., Time on the Cross, Vol. I: The Economics of American Negro Slavery;
Vol. II: Evidence and Methods, Boston 1974; David P., and Temin P., Slavery: The Progres¬
sive Institution?, in: Journal of Economic History, 34 (1974); the entire issue of Explorations
in Economic History, 12 (1975); R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engemarn, Explaining the Relative Ef¬
ficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South, in: American Economic Review, 67
(1977); Haskeil, T., et al., in: American Economic Review 69, (1979); and Fogel R. W., and
Engerman S. L., Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum
South: Reply, in: American Economic Review, 70 (1980); and David R, et al., Reckoning
with Slavery, N.Y. 1976.
41. The David-Temin discussion (in 1974 and 1977) suggests that the bias favoring the South is
unknown, but that it could, in the extreme, explain the whole of the relative advantage re¬
corded by Fogel and Engerman. Interested readers are referred to the Fogel-Engerman reply
to this criticism in the American Economic Review, 70 (1980). I should add that the point I
am making is not identical with the general thrust of the David-Temin critique of Time on
the Cross. For the purposes of the present argument, the South's alleged productivity lead
can be seen as a welfare advantage over the North, though one which is demand-dependent.
David and Temin, however, would doubt whether the assumptions of welfare economics ap¬
ply to unfree societies such as the antebellum South at all. I find it hard to resist their argu¬
ments on this point, though I have the feeling that a strict construction of their remarks
could considerably narrow the ränge of comparative economic growth history. My point, it
must be reemphasized, is that productivity comparisons will involve welfare judgements in
many relevant cases. The reader is referred, once more, to the rather loose, non-optimal con¬
cept of welfare applied here—and discussed in sections 3d. and 3e. of the paper.
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dices as indicators of physical or technical efficiency articulated there does have gen¬
eral validity for all comparative studies of productivity. For there are not very many
sets of productivity figures which will stand comparison without translation into
some common denominator. There are some, e.g. grain yields, or tons of coal mined
per miner-hour, but their ränge of application is limited. The desired translation, in
any case, will involve consideration of prices and quantities of commodities, weight¬
ing them, and as an inevitable part of the counterfactual experiment which choosing
such weights involves, bias. Historians of comparative productivity, that is the con¬
clusion to be drawn here, should neither deny the existence of such biases nor seek to
escape them, but should instead attempt to construct their studies so that the inevita¬
ble biases will not invalidate their results.
Although I do not believe that productivity data offer us more "objective" evi¬
dence of economic progress than do those on real incomes per capita, they are nev¬
ertheless essential. They are essential, because the supply side is just as indispensable
to analysis of economic development as the demand side and probably more accessi¬
ble to research. For this reason an entire generation of economists and economic his¬
torians over the past several decades has discussed economic growth in terms of
them. Those scholars have conceived of economic growth (or development), for bet¬
ter or worse, as a technical process in which inputs of productive factors are trans¬
formed via a production function into output. They have retained this schema of re¬
lationships while disaggregating the process down to the sectoral or regional level,
and they have managed to refine some of the input measures (e. g., by Converting the
labor input with the help of educational data into a ränge of labor inputs of differing
quality) without making the entire set of accounts—for that is what this system of
production—function relationships is—inconsistent or noncomparable.42 Given its
widespread acceptance, this system of relationships offers possibilities for further
comparative study which it would be foolish to ignore.
A possibly superficial, but nonetheless logical, argument for focusing on produc¬
tivity change is the latter's contribution to long-run changes in per capita income.
Long-run economic growth in those countries for which estimates exist, has resulted
largely from increased Output per unit of input, i.e., from productivity growth.43
42. This is clearly not the proper place for a bibliographical survey, but a few major contribu¬
tions to the "growth paradigm" should be mentioned: Abramovitz M., Resource and Output
Trends in the United States since 1870, in: American Economic Review, 56 (1956); Solow R.
M., Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, in: Review of Economics and
Statistics, 39 (1957); Denison E., The Sources ofEconomic Growth and the Alternatives before
Us, N.Y. 1962; Ibid, Why Growth Rates Differ, Washington 1967; Jorgenson D., and Gril-
iches Z., The Explanation of Productivity Change, in: Review of Economic Studies (1967);
Kuznets, in Modern Economic Growth and elsewhere has extended the empirical basis for
growth studies and thus deserves mention here. I have found useful discussions of growth
and technical change in Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12, and also in Gould, Economic
Growth, Chapter 5,
43. See, for example, the discussion of Denison's findings for the U.S. (1909-57) in Kuznets
Modern Economic Growth, pp. 80-82 (where an anual rate of growth per capita income of
1.44 per cent is attributed to the growth of capital and land inputs (.18), quality improve¬
ments of labor (.58) and factor productivity (.67). See also the correlation between per capita
income and output per man-hour for 14 industrial countries (1870-1965) indicated in Gould,
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There is no need to reproduce the basic estimates here, for they are common knowl¬
edge. Rather more useful may be some discussion ofthe qualifications ofthose find¬
ings, for they are likely to be relevant to some of the historical studies of productivity
currently getting underway.
Our point of departure is the discussion ofthe so-called "residual", the increase in
total factor productivity which—according to the earliest estimates of aggregate pro¬
duction functions—accounted for between 50 and 85 percent of modern growth in
industrial countries such as the U. S.A. (in the 20th Century).44 Diagram 1 taken from
J. D. Gould's excellent survey of growth history, offers an incomplete list of dangers
associated with residual analysis. Missing there, but worthy of mention, are quality
changes or differences in the inputs of labor (obvious and often noted), capital (less
obvious, but also of probable significance), and natural resources. This deserves
mention because the productivity of these factors should be standardized according
to quality or comparisons will be misleading. In the studies cited by Gould (and oth¬
ers), for example, stronger, healthier and better educated labor as well as improved
capital equipment contribute to enlargement of the measured productive inputs and
reduction of their measured productivity.45 What the diagram—and the literature
supporting it—makes clear is that many factors explain (measured) productivity
growth. That could mean that the traditional emphasis upon the role of technical
change—on one interpretation "Di" in the diagram and according to another inter¬
pretation. "Ci"—requires modification. In its place we might want to install im¬
proved allocation of resources (C2), economies of scale (C3), and/or what historians
tend to call "entrepreneurship" (here D2). However, no consensus on the weighting
of these various components has yet emerged, so it is too early to forecast a justified
neglect of technology.46
Some of the components listed in Gould's diagram have their counterparts in the
recent historical literature on economic growth. Interestingly, agricultural history is
relatively rieh in examples. To mention just three, David and Griliches for the U. S.
in two different periods, and O'Brien and Keyder in their 19th-century British-
French comparisons, have identified both improved resource allocation and econom-
Economic Growth, p. 22. However, these results depends on the assumption that the factor
inputs have been correctly measured—and the assumption has been questioned. Index num¬
ber bias may be significant. On this see Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12.
44. The earliest and perhaps most striking result was Solow's finding that about 85 per cent of
American productivity change, 1909-1949 was attributable to technical change. Correction
for the quality of labor, however, reduced this contribution to the share indicated in the pre¬
vious footnote. Further research brought further fluctuations in the share, one study (by Jor-
genson and Griliches) even virtually eliminating technical change (or factor productivity).
But see on this Usher, Measurement, Chapter 12.
45. In Why Growth Rates Differ (Chapter 7-9 and Appendix F) Denison justifies an increase in
the growth share attributable to the labor input for "Northwest Europe", 1950-62, from .52
to .83 per cent when the latter is corrected for education and age-sex composition. This re¬
duces the "residual" from 3.33 to 3.07 in percentage points of change per annum.
46. Much depends on how technical change has been and is understood. One can clearly fore¬
cast a reduced importance for concern with technical change in the narrow, engineering
sense. Technical change, however, can take on an extremely broad meaning, e.g., to inciude
changes in the quality of output. It is not inconceivable that experiments along these lines













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ies of scale as major sources of productivity growth and/or productivity differ¬
ences.47 D. Mc Closkey, R. Allen, and S. Webb, on the other hand, have discussed
these sources plus entrepreneurship and technical change against the background of
the comparative history of heavy industrial growth in Great Britain, Germany and
the U. S. in the 19th Century—without arriving at any general agreement on their rela¬
tive importance.48 Disagreement can be instructive, however, and in the case at hand,
we come to realize how much results depend upon assumptions (e.g., concerning the
degree of competition), the choice of data, and/or the scope of the investigation. For
example, whereas the Mc Closkey study concluded—on the basis of international in¬
put and Output price comparison and the competitive, marginal-cost pricing assump¬
tion—that British steel producers were losing ground to U.S. and German rivals to¬
wards the end of the 19th Century because of demand and relative input cost shifts
but not because of declining relative efficiency, both Allen and Webb challenged this
pricing assumption—particularly as applied to German data. Allen examined both
German and American costs and prices and Webb German ones, and both showed
that the use of cost data not deduced from prices indicates a clear British lag in rela¬
tive efficiency, i. e. a lag in relative total factor productivity. What is not clear from all
of this, as suggested above, is whether such a lag represents a deficiency in "entre¬
preneurship", a technological gap, an economies of scale gap, a lack of demand, or
all of these things. The answer to this question, it seems, will require further modell¬
ing.49
It would be easy to expand on the relationship between the "residual" and compa¬
rative productivity history. The preceding remarks have barely scratched the method¬
ological surface. But instead of continuing this rambling journey through the litera-
47. David R, The Mechanization of Reaping in the ante-bellum Midwest, reprinted in David P.,
Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, Essays on American and British Experi¬
ence in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 1975; Griliches Z., The Sources of Measured Pro¬
ductivity Growth: United States Agriculture, 1940-60, in: Journal of Political Economy, 71
(1963); O'Brien and Keyder, Economic Growth, Chapter 5. It may be worth adding that this
is consistent with the traditional view that the reallocation of labor out of agriculture into in¬
dustry must have been a major source of aggregate productivity growth in the 19th Century,
but that consistency cannot be assumed. For the postwar European Situation see Gould, Eco¬
nomic Growth, p. 320 (drawing on Denison, Why Growth Rates Differ).
48. McCIoskey D., Economic Maturity and Entrepreneurial Decline: British Iron and Steel, 1870-
1913, Cambridge 1973; Allen, International Competition; Webb, Tariffs.
49. The summary in the text cannot pretend to do justice to a complicated "cliometric" debate.
On the German side, Webb stresses market imperfection and scale economies leading to
more investment and "embodied" technical change. By implication, the lack of these factors
could explain Britain's relative Stagnation. For Britain, however, McCIoskey and even Allen
acknowledge natural resource disadvantages with consequences for technical change, profit-
ability and investment. McCIoskey, to be sure, tends to stress slow demand in Britain rather
than slow productivity as the reason for this industry's relative decline and he expressly re-
jects the thesis of "entrepreneurial failure", whereas Allen finds slow productivity change
and possibly faulty entrepreneuership. Given the comparative nature of much of the analy¬
sis, it is rather surprising to find virtually no discussion of index number problems—either
on the output or input side. That could be a source of bias in the results reported. On the
whole, this discussion casts doubt on the operational usefulness of the residual components
of Diagram1 for quantitative sectoral studies of productivity.
52
ture, let me conclude by returning, once more, to the discussion of Fogel and Enger-
man's controversial Interpretation of slave agriculture in the ante-bellum Amencan
South
The justification for taking up this particular example is that it illustrates better
than most the key significance which productivity measurement can have for major
historiographical questions I believe that Fogel and Engermann approached an im¬
portant question—the problem of southern slavery—correctly They wished to estab¬
lish, in a quantitative manner, what the economic bases of southern slavery were,
without losing sight of the broader issues of social and pohtical history at stake I
happen to disagree with their own Interpretation of their findings,50 but for present
purposes it is the findings themselves and their denvations which deserve discussion
It must suffice here to point out that both findings and interpretations have enor¬
mous imphcations for history, that is, that the example is not a trivial, obscure, or
narrowly technical one
Our concern is with the productivity or "relative efficiency" question Fogel and
Engerman argued that, contrary to what a generation of histonans had believed and
propagated, the ante-bellum slave economy was not only highly profitable for its
plantation-owning ehte but also relatively efficient—as measured by its aggregate
rate of growth of output per head of population and per input of productive factors,
and as measured by the level of its Output per factor input in relation to the rest of
the United States By a process of ehmination, those authors attnbuted this "relative
efficiency"—and here is where controversy arose—to the high quality or efficiency
of slave labor Our discussion touches on four points (1) the representativeness of
the data, (2) the identification of labor efficiency as the key factor, (3) the quality of
labor inputs, and (4) the quality of land mputs (1) Despite its lengthy discussion of
sources and methods (in Volume II) Time on the Cross does not permit readers to
clearly identify the sample of evidence going into the estimates of relative efficiency
(or total factor productivity) It is clear that the U S Census of Agriculture for 1860,
with data on individual farms and plantations operating in that year, is the main
source We also know the basic sample used (taken from the 1860 census and known
as the "Parker-Gallmann sample" after the names of the two economic histonans
who produced it) However, that Information on the size distribution of these pro¬
duction units or on the variance of productivity measures across it which Time on the
Cross gives does not suffice to firmly establish the representativeness of the data
50 I disagree with their clear distinction between slavery as a retrograde pohtical and moral in
stitution and slave agriculture as a viable, successful economic system Since the essence of
slavery was, in G Wnght's succinct words, the "involuntary reallocation of family labor
from nonmarket economic activity to production of crops for sale, it meant a loss of leisure
and freedom which had, in terms of the imputations discussed earher, a significant eco
nomic dimension imperfectly reflected in the market results summarized under the heading
of "efficiency" Cf Wright G , The Efficiency ofSlavery Another Interpretation in Amencan
Economic Review, 69 (1979), p 225 I also disagree with their belief that the demonstration
of high productivity and positive work attitudes among black slaves rescues them from pos
thumous demgration On the contrary, one could argue that since, historically, much mean
ingfui labor protest has taken the form of Sabotage of work processes through slowdowns
absenteeism and breakage, Fogel and Engerman's attempt to find positive work attitudes
among slaves amounts to an attempt to denigrate them
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base. Since the basic, Parker-Gallmann sample was restricted to counties speciahzing
in cotton production, it is hard to know how generalizations about the South as a
whole or comparison between free farming and slave farming within the South
should be assessed. Thus, the findings that slave agriculture was 28 percent more effi¬
cient than free agriculture in the South in 1860 or that Southern agriculture was 35
percent more efficient than Northern agriculture in the same year are difficult to in¬
terpret.51 Finally, we are not told to what extent the findings are sensitive to the dis¬
proportionate weight of 1860 data. It seems doubtful whether the entire ante-bellum
period (1820-60?) is well characterized by this procedure. (2) Among the many com¬
ponents of productivity increases, Time on the Cross Singles out the "personal labor
efficiency" of black slaves as the main source of the superiority of Southern slave agri¬
culture (in Diagram 1, C 4). In so doing, they assign to the other components such as
economies of scale, technical know-how or managerial ability, an insignificant role.
They do find scale effects on large, slave plantations, but choose to interpret them in
part as a product of the character of slave labor. Management ability receives the
same treatment: "In a certain sense", they write, "all, or nearly all ofthe advantage is
attributable to the high quality of labor, for the main thrust of management was di¬
rected at improving the quality of labor".52 The trouble is, there is no clear demon-
stration of how their implicit weighting of the sources of productivity differentials
(between slave and free labor) can be justified. (3) Fogel and Engerman's compara¬
tive estimates of agricultural labor inputs in 1860 are biased upward against the
North (i. e., they understate the Southern input relative to the North). The reason for
this is that they treat a southern man-year as equal to a northern man-year in spite of
the fact that (a) the southern climate permitted a fuller utilization of the entire work-
year—possibly by as much as 60 days, or at least one third of the northern work-
year—and although (b) slaves worked more hours per year than did free farm work¬
ers (in the North and South) and were significant, of course, only in the South.53
Plausible corrections, suggested by David and Temin in their critique of Time on the
Cross and based on a comparison of hours worked by blacks before and after eman-
51. The two estimates may not be comparable since the latter figures must represent a weighted
average of a sample whereas the former may or may not. They rest on the Parker-Gallman
sample, but nothing is said on extrapolation techniques or sample variances. In fact, the
book contains very little raw data with which readers could check on the Fogel-Engerman
Claims. See David and Temin, Progressive Institution?, pp. 764- 65, esp. notes 37 and 38.
52. Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, I, p. 210. I find this plausible, given the nature of
slave agriculture and the input shares Fogel and Engerman use. However, those shares are
not explicitly justified—they could embody an index number problem of their own—and
even if they could be deemed satisfactory, we are given little basis for choosing between a
high work intensity caused by management and that produced voluntarily by labor. See Has¬
keil T., Explaining the Relative Efficiency of Slave Agriculture in the Antebellum South: A
Reply to Fogel-Engerman, in: American Economic Review, 69 (1979).
53. As David and Temin point out, Time on the Cross does not document its assertion concern¬
ing the rough equality of the workyear in slave and free agriculture. Moreover, in one huge
correction they deduct 25 per cent of rural slave labor from their input measure on the
grounds that this share represented "domestics". But they do not make it clear whether this
deduction is maintained in the next estimate, which is corrected (downward) for age-earn-
ings profiles. This amounts to a bias ageinst the North whose labor force is not so cor¬
rected.
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cipation, lead to an increased labor input to slave agriculture of between 28 and 34
percent. (4) By using average land values to adjust acreage figures and, hence, land
inputs in North and South, Time on the Cross implicitly applies the theory of rent to
natural differences in soil fertility and assumes perfectly competitive national capital,
land and agricultural product markets. But given the high rate of interest on mort-
gages in the South and the preferred position of presumably risk-averse southern
landowners in the land market there, land prices in the South might well tend to un-
derstate the productive contribution of land's natural fertility. Moreover, land prices
would also be likely to be lower in an area relatively poorly served by transportation
facilities—such as the South—because prices received by farms for agricultural prod¬
uets in the South would be lower relative to final market prices (according to which
Outputs were weighted) than those received by farmers in the North. This could be
corrected for by reducing southern land productivity by the appropriate amount (or
by other means). In any case, recalculation of land inputs along these lines would in¬
crease Southern land inputs relative to the North.54
The upshot of this brief discussion is that a great deal can depend on historical
productivity measurement, whereas the latter can depend, in turn, on assumptions
about Outputs, inputs, and residual components whose verification may be extremely
difficult. In the present example, had the questioning of such assumptions early on
led in the directions suggested here, the puzzle of a high-produetivity slave economy
propelled by its qualititively superior labor force might have never emerged. The
moral of the story, for our purposes, is not simply that a provocative thesis may be
essential to get research activity into significant problems going, but also that where
such research is dominated by systematic and explicitly quantitatively comparative
methods, corrections of provocative theses and puzzles are possible.
Conclusion
Given the essentially descriptive and taxonomical character of this paper, it would be
inappropriate to conclude with Statements even more sweeping and summary than
those already made. I have attempted, no doubt presumptiously, to define the field of
national income and productivity history from the point of view of methodology. At
the same time, the paper seeks to call attention to certain areas within the field which
coincide, in my opinion, with the research needs and interests of comparative Euro¬
peans economic history (the comparative history of prices and consumption pattern
and tastes Stands out, it seems to me, as such an area). And finally, there is the ques¬
tion of the wider implications of comparative income and productivity history. The
last section ofthe paper discussed one example taken from American history (though
the comparison was m/ra-national rather than international) but European history
must also be bristling with comparable issues. One such might be seen in the liberal
agrarian reforms carried out in the nineteenth Century, and to which one may attach
the question: did they help, hinder, or result from productivity change? And to what
54. There is some reason for believing that national price weights overvalue southern agncul¬
tural output relative to the North in 1860. Cf. David and Temin, Progressive Institution9
p. 774.
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extent was the rise of free trade in western Europe during the middle decades of the
nineteenth Century the product of rising income and productivity levels? No doubt,
such themes lack the political clout of the problems of American slavery. But what
about the German Weimar Republic and its aftermath? If the problem ofthe Weimar
Republic in Germany can be seen as dependent upon gaps between real wages and
productivity, how are we to interpret that gap in other European countries during the
same time? And what about subsequent periods? Lack of patience, lack of knowl¬
edge, and perhaps lack of imagination, on my part, limit the list; but I am sure it can
be extended. The more difficult task will be the income and productivity studies
themselves. They will be welcome.
Zusammenfassung:
Pro-Kopf-Einkommen und Produktivität als Indikatoren
für Entwicklung und Wohlstand. Bemerkungen zur Kuznetsianischen
Wirtschaftsgeschichte
1. Die Verwendung der makroökonomischen Größe Volkseinkommen pro Einwoh¬
ner (VpE) in wirtschaftshistorischen Untersuchungen hängt mit dem sog. „Wachs¬
tumsparadigma" zusammen: geht es in solchen Untersuchungen um die Beschrei¬
bung und/oder Interpretation des Wirtschaftswachstums, so ist jene Größe (oder
ein gleichwertiger Ersatz) - und deren Komponenten - unentbehrlich. Kritik an
das Paradigma sollte dennoch von Kritik an der Größe selbst unterschieden wer¬
den.
2. Dieser Beitrag geht von der Annahme aus, daß Länder, wie einzelne Wirtschafts¬
subjekte, nach materieller Wohlstandsteigerung streben, und daß der Erfolg dieses
Strebens, d.h. Wohlfahrt, an der Entwicklung des VpE gemessen werden kann.
3. Kritik an der Verwendung des VpE als Wohlstandsindikator kann in 5 Punkten
aufgegliedert werden: (1) das Problem nichtmaterieller Güter; (2) das Problem der
nichtmarktwirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten; (3) die Definition der End- bzw. Zwi¬
schenprodukte; (4) die Annahme von konstanten Präferenzen (einschließlich In¬
dexzifferprobleme); und (5) das Problem der Verteilung. Diese Probleme qualifi¬
zieren die Interpretation von VpE als Indikator der Wohlfahrtssteigerung, recht¬
fertigen aber nicht deren gänzliche Zurückweisung.
4. Alternativen zum VpE wie z. B. Tobin und Nordhaus' M. E. W. oder die „sozialen
Indikatoren" sind in einzelnen Fällen empfehlenswert aber kein allgemein akzep¬
tabler Ersatz für das VpE.
5. Produktivitätsmessung als Instrument der wachstumsorientierten Geschichts¬
schreibung unterliegt demselben methodischen Problem wie das VpE. Dies kann
an der Diskussion einiger neuerer wirtschaftshistorischer Arbeiten insbesondere
der Arbeit von Fogel und Engerman über die amerikanische Sklavenwirtschaft im
19. Jahrhundert, gezeigt werden. Diese Diskussion zeigt aber zugleich die große
Bedeutung der „Produktivitätsgeschichte" für allgemeine historiographische Fra¬
gen.
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